The State of Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule by Seidelson, David E.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 13 Number 2 Article 4 
1974 
The State of Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule 
David E. Seidelson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David E. Seidelson, The State of Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 13 Duq. L. Rev. 251 (1974). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol13/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
The State of Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule
David E. Seidelson*
The state of mind exception to the hearsay rule' may be, simulta-
neously, the most elusive and the most pernicious of the many hear-
say exceptions. The perniciousness arises from the potential capac-
ity of the exception to consume the entire rule. After all, in one way
* Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. There are several definitions of hearsay. The one used here is: an extrajudicial declara-
tion offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. For the purpose of
comparison, the following are offered to the reader:
Too much should not be expected of a definition. It cannot furnish answers to all of
the complex problems of an extensive field (such as hearsay) in a sentence. The most
it can accomplish is to furnish a helpful starting point for discussion of the problems,
and a memory aid in recalling some of the solutions. But if the definition is to remain
brief and understandable, it will necessarily distort some parts of the picture. Simplifi-
cation has a measure of falsification.
With these warnings the following definition is proposed: Hearsay evidence is testi-
mony in courts, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement
being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus
resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter.
MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 584 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
"Hearsay" is a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A)
inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath, subject to cross-examina-
tion and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial or hearing or in a deposition, or
(B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identifi-
cation of a person made after perceiving him; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is
(A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a
statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject,
or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a state-
ment by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspir-
acy.
Proposed Rules of Evid. for U.S. District Courts & Magistrates, H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974), R. 801(c), (d)(1), (2) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules of Evidence]. After
this article was written, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. Law No. 93-
595 (Jan. 2, 1975); 12A U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1 (Jan. 15, 1975). Subsection (1)(c),
dealing with prior identifications has been excised from the statute.
"Hearsay evidence" is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a
witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the
matter stated.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(a) (West 1966) [hereinafter cited as the California Evidence Code].
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or another, every declaration to some extent evidences the declar-
ant's then existing state of mind. Were the exception made applica-
ble to every extrajudicial declaration, the hearsay rule itself would
virtually disappear. The elusiveness arises from the difficulty in
determining just when the exception should be utilized and when
it should be eschewed, for eschewal in appropriate circumstances
may be a condition precedent to retention of the viability of the
hearsay rule.
To determine when the state of mind exception is properly assert-
able, it is appropriate, first, to determine why the exception has
received judicial' and statutory3 recognition. Psychoanalytical con-
2. A man's state of mind or feeling can only be manifested to others by countenance,
attitude or gesture, or by sounds or words, spoken or written. The nature of the fact to
be proved is the same, and evidence of its proper tokens is equally competent to prove
it, whether expressed by aspect or conduct, by voice or pen. When the intention to be
proved is important only as qualifying an act, its connection with that act must be
shown, in order to warrant the admission of declarations of the intention. But whenever
the intention is of itself a distinct and material fact in a chain of circumstances, it may
be proved by contemporaneous oral or written declarations of the party.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892).
One of the exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay is that a man's declarations as to
his state of mind may be used to establish that state of mind and, to some degree, such
other things as proof of a state of mind tends to establish.
Nuttal v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 1956).
3. (a) Subject to Section 1252, evidence of a statement of declarant's then existing
state of mind ...is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when:
(1) The evidence is offered to prove the declarant's state of mind . . . at that
time or at any other time when it is itself an issue in the action; or
(2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.
(b) This section does not make admissible evidence of a statement of memory or
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250 (West 1966).
Subject to Section 1252, evidence of a statement of the declarant's state of mind...
at a time prior to the statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if:
(a) The declarant is unavailable as a witness; and
(b) The evidence is offered to prove such prior state of mind . . . when it is itself
an issue in the action and the evidence is not offered to prove any fact other than such
state of mind ....
Id. § 1251.
Evidence of a statement is inadmissible under this article if the statement was made
under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.
Id. § 1252.
(a) Evidence of a statement made by a declarant who is unavailable as a witness
that he has or has not made a will, or has or has not revoked his will, or that identifies
his will, is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule.
(b) Evidence of a statement is inadmissible under this section if the statement was
made under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.
Id. § 1260.
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siderations aside, each of us is "the world's foremost authority" as
to our own state of mind. Our manifestations of that state of mind,
therefore, come from the most competent source possible, at least
in terms of capacity to know the state of mind. If, in addition to
recognizing that capacity, it is possible to negate substantially any
error of recollection and any motive to be disingenuous in regard to
the declaration manifesting the state of mind, the circumstances
would bespeak trustworthiness in the most emphatic manner. Con-
sequently, a declaration evidencing the declarant's presently exist-
ing state of mind (so long, faulty recollection), made in circumstan-
ces where the declarant would have no reason to misrepresent his
state of mind (good-bye, disingenuousness), would be an extrajudi-
cial declaration resting on a substantial foundation of trustworthi-
ness. Trustworthiness,4 while critical to hearsay exceptions gener-
ally, is but one element necessary for the appropriate recognition of
the state of mind exception. The other essential element, applicable
to all proffered evidence but sometimes uniquely difficult to apply
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind . . . , but not including
a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
Proposed Rules of Evidence, R. 803(3).
The Advisory Committee's Note to rule 803(3), immediately following the rule in its
original proposed form, stated in part:
The exclusion of "statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed" is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of the hearsay rule which would
otherwise result from allowing state of mind, provable by a hearsay statement, to serve
as the basis for an inference of the happening of the event which produced the state of
mind ....
Proposed Rules of Evid. for U.S. District Courts & Magistrates, R. 803(3), Note (Rev. Draft
1971) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee] (These excerpts from the Advisory Com-
mittee's Note have been excised from H.R. 5463).
To the extent that the California Evidence Code and the Proposed Rules of Evidence would
exclude state of mind declarations for the purpose of proving "the fact believed," no matter
how well based the belief may be, I disagree with their conclusions. See text following note
13 infra.
4. Trustworthiness and necessity are generally considered the dual foundations for many
hearsay exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
commented on in Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 76, 88 n.109 (1971). Where necessity is required, it is deemed satisfied by the unavaila-
bility of declarant as a witness. Neither the California Evidence Code nor the Proposed Rules
of Evidence require unavailability as a condition precedent to the admission of a state of mind
declaration, with the exception of the circumstance stated in CAL. EvID. CODE §1251 (West
1966), set forth in note 3 supra. My belief is that unavailability should not be a condition
precedent to the admission of state of mind declarations.
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to the state of mind exception, is relevancy.' No matter how
trustworthy the state of mind declaration may be in terms of com-
petence, contemporaneousness and ingenuousness, it should not be
admitted unless it is relevant.
Let's try some of those tests for determining the admissibility of
a state of mind declaration in a factual situation familiar to most
judges, lawyers and law students. In Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Hillmon,l plaintiff sued two insurance companies to recover the
benefits of policies issued on the life of her husband. After plain-
tiff had introduced evidence of the insured's death in Crooked
Creek, Colorado, the defendants offered evidence that the cadaver
in Crooked Creek was not that of the insured but, rather, of one
Walters. The defendants' evidence included two letters written by
Walters in Wichita, Kansas. Both letters, one to his sister and one
to his fiancee, expressed his intention to leave Wichita with the
insured and go to Crooked Creek. The Supreme Court of the United
States concluded that the letters should have been admitted as
state of mind exceptions to the hearsay rule.
The letters did manifest the state of mind of the declarant, Wal-
ters; more specifically, they evidenced his intention of going to
Crooked Creek. Since Walters knew his own state of mind better
than anyone else, the source was competent. Because the state of
mind evidenced was that of declarant at the very time he authored
the letters, contemporaneousness was satisfied and, consequently,
faulty recollection negated. Since the letters were written to declar-
ant's sister and fiancee (as opposed to, for example, two dunning
creditors), there seemed to be no reason, to believe that declarant
had any motive to misrepresent his state of mind with regard to his
travel plans; disingenuousness was, therefore, eliminated. Thus,
5. Relevancy is particularly difficult to define with adequate verbal and legal precision.
Most judges, lawyers and law students seem better able to determine its existence intuitively
than to ascribe to it a satisfactory definition. Compare:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Proposed Rules of Evidence, R. 401,
with:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility
of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove
any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1966).
6. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
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competence, contemporaneousness and ingenuousness were satis-
fied. That left relevancy.
Obviously, the basic issue in the case was whether the Crooked
Creek cadaver was that of the insured or Walters. Whether or not
Walters was in Crooked Creek at the time of death, therefore, was
a critical factor in resolving that issue. His stated intention to leave
Wichita bound for Crooked Creek, at a time which would have
afforded him the opportunity of arriving in Crooked Creek shortly
before the death, was relevant to his actual presence in Crooked
Creek at the critical time. Consequently, relevancy existed.7
It would seem that in Hilimon the Court's conclusion as to the
admissibility of the letters written by Walters was justified as a
state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, which exception had the
appropriate bases of competence, contemporaneousness, ingenuous-
ness and relevancy.
Now, with the reader's indulgence, I'd like to deal with a series
of state of mind situations, progressing generally from the easiest
to the most difficult, in order to determine in what circumstances
a court would be justified in receiving such evidence. In each in-
stance, we'll examine the likely and appropriate mental processes
of the court. In so doing, we may be able to identify judicial methods
which would both prevent the exception from devouring the rule
and strip away some of the elusiveness from the exception.
Perhaps the simplest state of mind situation exists when (1) state
of mind has primary, independent relevancy and (2) the manifesta-
tion of that state of mind is not hearsay. Assume that plaintiff sues
defendant insurance company seeking to recover double benefits
(sometimes referred to as double indemnity) under a clause in the
contract covering accidental death. Also assume that, while the
defendant concedes the death of insured, it defends on the ground
that his death was the result of suicide, not accident. Insured's state
of mind shortly before his death, to the extent that the state of mind
7. Whether or not Walters intended to travel to Crooked Creek at a time which would
have afforded him the opportunity of being present when the conceded death occurred was
not, in and of itself, an issue in the case. Rather, his declared travel plans became relevant
to determine whether or not he was in Crooked Creek at the time of the death. His presence
in Crooked Creek at that time was relevant to determine whether the cadaver was that of
the insured or of Walters. Thus, Walters' asserted travel plans did not have primary, indepen-
dent relevancy; rather, they became relevant to determine another matter, admittedly rele-
vant. For discussion of this "secondary" relevancy of a state of mind declaration, see text
following note 13 infra.
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reflects either a mind bent on suicide or one actively and pleasantly
contemplating continued life, has obvious relevancy. If defendant
calls W to the stand and, in response to plaintiff's request for a side-
bar offer of proof, asserts that W will testify that, shortly before
insured's death, W observed insured sobbing uncontrollably or dis-
playing a face reflecting overwhelming sadness' in circumstances in
which insured assumed he was alone and unobserved, how should
the court react to a hearsay objection asserted by plaintiff?. It would
seem that no hearsay problem exists. Insured's sobbing or facial
expression could hardly be characterized as a declaration at all,
therefore, certainly not an extrajudicial declaration offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted therein.' The hearsay objection
seems groundless. Is the offered testimony relevant? To the extent
that the sobbing or facial expression evidences a state of mind other
than an active and pleasant contemplation of continued life, the
answer would appear to be yes. Presumably, the testimony of W
would be received. The testimony as to insured's state of mind
would be relevant and, since no extrajudicial declaration is in-
volved, it would be unnecessary to characterize the testimony as an
exception to the hearsay rule.
Now let's retain a similar degree of primary, independent rele-
vancy for the state of mind but create a hearsay problem. We can
accomplish this and retain most of the hypothetical situation used
immediately above by effecting a change in defendant's offer of
proof. Assume that defendant asserts that W, a lifelong friend of the
insured, will testify that, shortly before his death, insured said to
W, "I don't want to live to see another day." How should the court
react to plaintiff's hearsay objection? The extrajudicial declaration
8. For cases permitting a witness to characterize the mental state of another on the basis
of sensory perceptions of the witness see Cole v. United States, 327 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir.
1964) ("[A] witness need not be an expert in order to draw a conclusion that a person is
distraught who has suddenly grown pale and is shaking."); Kane v. Fields Corner Grille, Inc.,
341 Mass. 640, 171 N.E.2d 287 (1961).
9. A definition fairly representing the position of Professor Morgan is that hearsay
includes the evidence of any conduct of a person, verbal or nonverbal, which he in-
tended to operate as an assertion, if it is used to prove that the assertion is true or that
the asserter believes it is true, unless it is subject to cross-examination by the one
against whom it is used at the trial at which it is offered. Morgan would also include
as hearsay any conduct not intended as an assertion if it is offered to prove both the
state of mind of such person and the external event or condition which caused him to
have that state of mind.
Wheaton, What Is Hearsay?, 46 IOWA L. REv. 210 (1961) (emphasis added), quoted in part in
D. LOuiSELL, J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 56 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as Wheaton].
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evidences insured's state of mind with regard to suicide only to the
extent that the declaration was truthful. W's testimony will include
an extrajudicial declaration offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted therein; therefore, the testimony will be hearsay. Should
the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule persuade the court
to receive the offered evidence? Declarant was expressing his own
state of mind as it existed at the time of the declaration, in circum-
stances in which there was no apparent reason for him to misrepre-
sent his state of mind. Since the state of mind evidenced by the
declarant bears directly on the suicide issue which is basic to the
case, the state of mind is clearly relevant. The court should receive
the evidence under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.
Two factors should be emphasized about the state of mind evi-
dence received in both of the preceding hypothetical cases. In each,
the state of mind had primary, independent relevancy. And in each,
that relevancy existed irrespective of the factual reasons for the
state of mind and without regard to whether or not the state of mind
was factually well-founded.
Take one more situation in which both of these characteristics
exist. D is charged with the murder of his wife X. D's defense is that
X's death was the result of suicide, not homicide. 0 During the de-
fense case, D calls W to the stand and, in response to the prosecu-
tion's request for a side-bar offer of proof, D asserts that W, a life-
long friend of X's, will testify that, shortly before her death, X said
to W, "I don't want to live to see another day." The prosecution
makes a hearsay objection. How should the court rule? The extraju-
dicial declaration of X is being offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted therein; the truthfulness of the declaration is essen-
tial to manifest the declarant's state of mind. But, just as clearly,
declarant's state of mind with regard to suicide has primary, inde-
pendent relevancy. That relevancy exists irrespective of the reasons
underlying the state of mind and without regard to whether or not
the state of mind was factually well-founded. Since the declaration
evidenced declarant's then existing state of mind in circumstances
10. Cf. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
Witnesses for the defendant had testified to declarations by Mrs. Shepard which
suggested a mind bent upon suicide, or at any rate were thought by the defendant to
carry that suggestion. More than once before her illness she had stated in the hearing
of these witnesses that she had no wish to live; and had nothing to live for, and on one
occasion she added that she expected some day to make an end to her life.
Id. at 102.
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negating any motive to misrepresent that state of mind, compe-
tence, contemporaneousness and ingenuousness complement the
relevancy. The court should overrule the hearsay objection and re-
ceive the evidence.
Suppose there is another homicide prosecution with D again
charged with the murder of his wife X, but.with circumstances
posing a considerably more difficult state of mind problem. The
prosecution calls W to the stand and, in response to a requested
side-bar offer of proof, asserts that W will testify that she was a
lifelong friend of X's and that X was visiting W the day before X's
death. During the visit, W answered the phone and heard a voice
she recognized as D's say, "Is my wife there?" W then put X on the
phone and heard X say the following: "No . . . please, no. . . you
wouldn't kill me after all these years . . . No, please don't say that
• . . What would happen to the children. . . They need a mother
• . . Oh, please, no . . . Don't say you'll kill me." X, pale and
trembling, then hung up the phone and, sobbing, asked W if she
could spend the night at W's home.1 If the defense objects to the
offered evidence as hearsay and as irrelevant, how should the court
react?
Clearly, a substantial portion of the offered testimony consists of
extrajudicial declarations made by X. Are those declarations offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein? Viewed realisti-
cally, the declarations assert that D threatened to kill X and they
are being offered to prove just that."2 They are extrajudicial declara-
tions offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted
therein. Does the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule justify
receiving the declarations? Since the declarations were contempora-
11. Frankly, I feel some discomfiture in using a hypothetical situation in which the pros-
ecution offers in evidence an accusatory declaration in circumstances where the declarant is
not available for cross-examination by the defendant, even where the unavailability arises
out of the death of declarant. In my view, the sixth amendment's confrontation clause should
be read broadly enough to preclude the admission of such a declaration. Seidelson, Hearsay
Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 76 (1971). However, I have
elected to use the hypothetical because (1) the Supreme Court has not seen fit to give the
confrontation clause such a broad reading, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), and (2) the
hypothetical lends itself to increasing degrees of difficulty in working with the state of mind
exception with only minimal tinkering with the facts.
12. Even if X's declarations are characterized as not intended by her to be assertions, they
would still be considered hearsay as "conduct not intended as an assertion [but] offered to
prove both the state of mind of such person and the external event or condition which caused
[her] to have that state of mind." Wheaton, supra note 9, at 210. Thus, whether or not X's
words are labeled "assertive," they should be characterized as hearsay.
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neous with decJarant's state of mind and were uttered by her in
circumstances tending to negate any motive to fabricate, compe-
tence, contemporaneousness and ingenousness seem satisfied. But,
what about relevancy?
If the question were, should a murder victim's declarations evi-
dencing her fear that her husband intended to kill her be received
in evidence against the husband in a homicide prosecution arising
out of the wife's death, the answer probably would be no. After all,
the wife's state of mind (fear that her husband intended to kill her)
might or might not be well-founded. Such a state of mind could be
the product of a number of acts on the part of the husband which
would have led any rational person to conclude that he intended to
kill his wife or it could be the product of a paranoid mind and wholly
lacking any rational factual basis. So long as these two possible
explanations for the wife's state of mind exist, each having about
equal probability, receipt in evidence of her fear would be inappro-
priate and prejudicial to the husband because the relevancy of the
wife's state of mind would not have been demonstrated. In such
circumstances, the court should eschew the offered state of mind
declarations."
In our hypothetical, however, does the prosecution wish to prove
ultimately X's state of mind at the time of the phone conversation
or the fact that D threatened to kill X? The prosecution probably
wants to prove the latter. The fact that D threatened the life of
the homicide victim the day before her death is clearly relevant.
Does the state of mind of X as evidenced by her declarations tend
to prove that D threatened her? Of course. The state of mind evi-
dence is being offered to prove that such threats were made. Once
it is concluded that (1) the making of the threats is relevant, and
(2) the state of mind declarations tend to prove that the threats were
made, then the state of mind declarations become relevant. Since
competence, contemporaneousness and ingenuousness have already
been satisfied, that final determination of relevancy should justify
the receipt of Ws offered testimony.
There is, however, one additional problem. Once it is determined
that X's state of mind declarations are being offered to prove that
13. A determination of inadmissibility of the declaration in those circumstances would
be consistent with both the CAL. Evm. CODE § 1250(b) (West 1966) and the Proposed Rules
of Evidence, R. 803(3), which would exclude a state of mind declaration evidencing declar-
ant's belief when offered to prove the fact believed. See note 3 supra.
1974
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D threatened X's life, there arises the possibility that X's state of
mind may not have been well-founded. More specifically, it is possi-
ble that D used no threatening words at all in his phone conversa-
tion with X, or, if he used threatening words, he did so only in jest.
This possibility is not being raised to challenge the ingenuousness
of X's declarations; the already noted circumstances surrounding
the declarations-Ws lifelong friendship with X, X's apparent emo-
tional reaction to D's words and her request to spend the night at
Ws home-would seem to be sufficient to negate disingenuousness.
Rather, the possibility is suggested that X may have misheard or
misapprehended the words spoken to her by D. Assuming that pos-
sibility to be the case, X's declarations would have no probative
value in proving that D had threatened her life.'4 For the trial court
confronted with the prosecution's offer of proof, the task would be
to determine whether or not the possibility that X may have misun-
derstood the words spoken by D is sufficiently substantial to war-
rant exclusion of the evidence. Perhaps a more legally appropriate
way in which to characterize the judicial chore, bearing in mind that
proponent's offer of proof should satisfy admission of the proffered
evidence, would be to determine whether or not the offer adequately
diminishes the likelihood of such a factual error by X so as to justify
admission.'"
The fact that X was speaking to her husband may, in itself, dim-
inish the likelihood of such a factual error on the part of X. Presum-
ably, the intimacy of the marital relationship (whatever its present
status may be) would provide each spouse with a unique capacity
to understand the words spoken by the other. In additon, the decla-
rations of X, as stated in the offer of proof, are tantamount to
14. That determination of inadmissibility would be consistent with the California Evi-
dence Code and the Proposed Rules of Evidence. See notes 3 & 13 supra.
15. Such a determination of admissibility apparently would be inconsistent with the
California Evidence Code and the Proposed Roles of Evidence. See notes 3 & 13 supra.
However, it would seem to be entirely consistent with Nuttal v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d 546
(3d Cir. 1956). In Nuttal, the late Judge Goodrich concluded that decedent's portion of a
phone conversation with his employment supervisor, as testified to by decedent's widow, was
admissible as a state of mind exception to the hearsay rule evidencing both declarant's belief
that his supervisor had pressured declarant to report to work and that the supervisor had in
fact applied such pressure.
When a man talks as Nuttal did and acts as Nuttal did during and immediately
following a conversation on the telephone with his boss, it has a tendency to show that
the boss was requiring him to come to work against his will.
Id. at 552. Judge Goodrich's conclusion was the product of his affirmative determination that
declarant's belief that he was being pressured to report to work was factually well-founded.
Vol. 13: 251
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repeated assertions by her to D of her understanding of D's words.
Had D not been uttering threatening words, or not been using them
seriously, he had ample opportunity to correct X's misapprehen-
sion. The declarations of X and the circumstances surrounding
them indicate that D offered no such comforting clarification.' The
trial court would be amply justified in concluding that the offer of
proof had sufficiently diminished the likelihood of factual error on
the part of X as to the stimulus for her state of mind declarations.
Thus, the state of mind declarations would have probative value as
to the specific relevant fact-whether or not D had threatened X.
That conclusion, complemented by the earlier conclusions as to
competence, contemporaneousness and ingenuousness, should re-
sult in receipt of the offered evidence.
There are two distinctions between the relevancy discerned in the
last hypothetical situation and that described in the preceding ones.
First, in each of the former situations, the state of mind evidence
had primary, independent relevancy; it went directly toward prov-
ing the existence or non-existence of a fact having independent legal
significance. The state of mind evidence was directly relevant to the
issue of suicide. In the last hypothetical, however, the state of mind
of X was not directly relevant to the issue of whether or not D killed
X; rather, it became relevant only because it tended to prove a fact
(D had threatened to kill X) which, in turn, was directly relevant
to the issue of guilt." Second, even that degree of relevancy de-
16. Similarly in Nuttal, "What Nuttal had to say during the telephone conversation was
subject to Marquette's [his supervisor's] comment and response." Id. at 553.
17. Whether or not such "secondary" relevancy would result in admissibility of the state
of mind declaration under the California Evidence Code or the Proposed Rules of Evidence
is not entirely clear. The more likely conclusion would appear to be that both would exclude
the evidence. California permits admissibility "to prove the declarant's state of mind...
when it is itself an issue in the action .. " CAL. EvD. CODE § 1250(a)(1) (West 1966). That
language suggests that the state of mind must have primary, independent relevancy. It also
"does not make admissible evidence of a statement of ... belief to prove the fact ...
believed." Id. § 1250(b). Similarly, the Proposed Rules of Evidence while admitting "[a]
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind .... " would exclude "a statement
of. . .belief to prove the fact believed. ... Proposed Rules of Evidence, R. 803(3). The
Advisory Committee's Note to rule 803(3) explains the language of the rule as precluding a
state of mind declaration from "serv[ing] as the basis for an inference of the happening of
the event which produced the state of mind." Advisory Committee, supra note 3. Since, in
our hypothetical situation, X's state of mind declaration is offered to prove that D threatened
to kill X, the declaration apparently would be excluded by the California Evidence Code and
the Proposed Rules of Evidence.
It seems more sensible to admit the declaration into evidence to prove that the threats were
made, if the court is able to conclude that declarant's state of mind-that D had threatened
1974
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pended on the state of mind declarations being factually well-
founded, unlike the declarations in the earlier hypotheticals which
were relevant irrespective of an accurate factual basis. It is in these
circumstances-where the declaration's relevancy is asserted not on
a primary, independent basis, but rather for the purpose of proving
another admittedly relevant fact and only to the extent that such
"secondary" relevancy is factually well-founded-that the test of
relevancy becomes most difficult.
Let's compound the difficulty. D is again charged with the mur-
der of his wife X. This time, the prosecution calls W to the stand
and makes the following offer of proof. W, a practicing lawyer, rep-
resented X in a separation action pending at the time of her death.
W is prepared to testify that, while X was in his office the day before
her death, X received a phone call from D. W took the call, recog-
nized D's voice and responded to D's request to speak to X by
handing the phone to X. W then heard X say: "No. . .please,
no. . .you wouldn't kill me after all these years. . .No, please don't
say that. . .What would happen to the children. . .They need a
mother. . .Oh, please, no. . .Don't say you'll kill me." X, pale and
trembling, then hung up the phone and, sobbing, told W, "I've got
to get out of here. I've got to get away."' 8
If D objects to the offered testimony both on relevancy and hear-
say grounds, how should the court react? It seems fair to conclude
that the prosecution is offering the evidence of X's state of mind
declarations for the purpose of proving that D threatened to kill X
one day before her death. Assuming that such threats would be
relevant, the declarations of X tending to prove that the threats
were made would become relevant. The declarations would have
that effect only if they were understood as truthful declarations that
D had threatened X. Again, the declarations may be characterized
her-was factually well-founded. This approach seems consistent with the philosophy ex-
pressed by Judge Goodrich:
One of the exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay is that a man's declarations as to
his state of mind may be used to establish that state of mind and, to some degree, such
other things as proof of a state of mind tends to establish.
Nuttal v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 1956). That same philosophy is manifested
in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892). See note 7 supra.
18. Cf. People v. Talle, 111 Cal. App. 2d 650, 245 P.2d 633 (1952), in which the court
concluded that a typewritten statement prepared by a wife at the request of counsel repre-
senting her in a separation action and describing her life with her husband was not admissible
as a state of mind exception to the hearsay rule when offered against her husband in a
homicide prosecution arising out of the death of his wife.
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as hearsay. To determine the propriety of invoking the state of mind
exception to permit the receipt of the declarations, the court should
consider competence, contemporaneousness and ingenuousness.
Since X was manifesting her own state of mind, and because she
was the world's foremost authority on that subject, competence
seems satisfied. Since the state of mind of X was that which existed
when she spoke, contemporaneousness is satisfied. But how about
ingenuousness?
It could be asserted by D that, in the circumstances stated, X had
a motive to misrepresent her state of mind. After all, there was a
separation action pending and X spoke in the presence of her law-
yer. She may have fabricated her state of mind and misrepresented
what D said to her over the phone either to impress her lawyer with
the urgency of the pending action or to create a situation in which
counsel could testify in the separation action to the impliedly as-
serted threats.'9 To the extent that X may have been so motivated,
there exists the possibility that her declarations may not have been
ingenuous.
It should be noted that, if it is assumed that X intentionally
misrepresented her state of mind for either of the litigation motives
suggested above, her disingenuous declarations impliedly asserting
that D had threatened her would be without factual basis. Here,
however, absence of a factual foundation for the declarations seems
more likely explicable in terms of disingenuousness than misappre-
hension of D's words by X. X would still possess that presumed
capacity, arising from the intimacy of the marital relationship, to
determine the meaning intended by D. And, further, had X simply
misunderstood the purport of D's words, her repeated assertions to
D that she understood him to be threatening her would have af-
19. In characterizing the statement prepared by the wife in Taile the court said:
It was, of course, a self-serving document prepared by the deceased purported to
recount past events, and giving her side of the story in reference to her marital difficul-
ties, for the purpose of aiding her in the separate maintenance action then pending.
Id. at 669, 245 P.2d at 644. Similarly, in our hypothetical situation, X's litigation motive
creates the possibility of disingenuousness.
To the extent that the wife's statement in Tale purported to recount past evidence it was
vulnerable as well on the ground that it may have been the product of faulty recollection. In
our hypothetical, that vulnerability is eliminated since X's declarations were contempora-
neous with the state of mind manifested by them.
Such characterizations, since made substantially at the time of the event they de-
scribed was perceived, are free from the possibility of lapse of memory on the part of
the declarant.
Nuttal v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 1956).
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forded D ample opportunity to assuage her concern. The fact that
X's declarations were made in the presence of a lawyer representing
her in a pending separation action against D, rather than in the
presence of a lifelong friend, is more suggestive of disingenuousness
than misapprehension.
Still, W is prepared to testify that X was pale, trembling and
sobbing after the conversation. Should that persuade the court that
W observed an honestly frightened rather than a disingenuous X?
One sufficiently devious to have arranged the phone call and to have
feigned a set of verbal reactions to nonexistent threats may have
been capable of pretending to have a nonexistent fear. Since it is
the prosecution which is offering W's testimony as to X's purported
state of mind declarations, presumably it should bear the initial
burden of persuading the court that the declarations honestly re-
flected declarant's then existing state of mind.
Assume that the prosecution makes this additional side-bar offer.
It will call witnesses to the stand who will testify that immediately
after leaving W's office, X purchased an airline ticket to a distant
city, registered in the local YWCA under an assumed name and
arranged for someone to bring her a few items of clothing from her
home. The prosecution also indicates that it will offer evidence that
X was found dead in her YWCA room the next day and that, before
her body was discovered, D was seen leaving the YWCA building.
How should this offer of proof affect the court's ruling on the admis-
sibility of W's testimony?
The asserted actions of X after leaving Ws office would be consis-
tent with the conduct of a woman fearful that her husband planned
to kill her. Such actions, however, would also be consistent with a
scheme to persuade W that D had threatened X, even if no such
threats had been made. But how would those actions have been
brought to W's knowledge to fortify his belief in the nonexistent
threats? X could have planned on calling W from the YWCA, telling
him she was registered under an assumed name, advising him of her
travel plans and ultimately phoning him after arriving in the distant
city. While all of this is possible, it does seem rather incredible.
Indeed, the court may well conclude that the additional offer of
proof justifies a preliminary determination that X's declarations
were not the product of an elaborate plan to deceive W but, rather,
were ingenuous manifestations of a fear for her life engendered by
threats uttered to her over the phone by D. In that case, the declara-
tions would satisfy the state of mind exception and would be admit-
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ted. The court's conclusion that X's declarations manifested an
honest belief that D had threatened her life satisfies both the ingen-
uousness required for a state of mind exception to the hearsay rule
and the relevancy required for all offered evidence. To the extent
that X's declared fear that D had threatened her life was factually
well-founded, her declarations would be relevant evidence that D
had made such threats.
Suppose that counsel for D asserts that, given the offered evi-
dence which the prosecution plans to produce placing D near the
apparent murder scene shortly before X's death was discovered, the
probative value of Ws testimony is diminished, since the other
offered evidence would be sufficient to show opportunity, and that
when that diminished probative value is weighed against the con-
tinuing, albeit diminished, possibility that X was being disingen-
uous with W, the possibility of a feigned state of mind makes the
testimony of W unduly prejudicial. Is the assertion persuasive?
Probably not. Even assuming that the other offered evidence indi-
cates that D had the opportunity of murdering X, it does not elimi-
nate or even diminish the probative value of evidence indicating a
desire to murder X on the part of D. The state of mind declarations
of X were offered as evidence tending to prove that D had threat-
ened to kill X, not that D had had the opportunity.
Alternatively, the defense could assert that the prosecution's en-
larged offer of proof, encompassing X's conduct after leaving W's
office, comprises independent evidence of fear on the part of X
which, in and of itself, is adequate for the prosecution's purpose.
Or, at least, it could be asserted that in light of the adequacy of
such evidence, X's declarations assume a diminished probative
value which, when considered along with the continuing, although
reduced, possibility of disingenuousness, should lead to the exclu-
sion of the declarations. How should the court react to that
assertion? Undoubtedly, the court would recognize that, although
X's conduct after leaving W's office may well evidence fear on her
part, that conduct does not indicate the source of that fear. More-
over, even if W is permitted to testify that X had spoken to D on
the phone immediately before leaving W's office, but W is precluded
from testifying to the substance of X's portion of the conversation,
the combined evidence might well bespeak fear on the part of X
stimulated by her phone conversation with D, but, clearly, the evi-
dence would not demonstrate that the fear had been engendered by
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threats on X's life made by D. There are any number of things D
could have said to X, other than threats by him to kill her, which
could have instilled fear in X. Absent Ws testimony as to X's phone
declarations, any of those other possibilities would seem about as
likely as threats uttered by D. Consequently, the court should con-
clude that the enlarged offer of proof does not diminish the proba-
tive value of X's declarations, that those declarations are relevant
to demonstrate that D threatened X's life, and that, since compe-
tence, contemporaneousness, ingenuousness and relevancy have
been adequately shown, the declarations should be received in evi-
dence.
Let's try one more hypothetical situation for the purpose of
further straining the court's determinations of relevancy and
whether or not the state of mind manifested by the declarations was
factually well-founded. Retaining the basic litigation framework of
D charged with the murder of his wife X, the prosecution calls W
to the stand and, in response to D's request, makes this side-bar
offer of proof. W, a lifelong friend of X, will testify that she visited
X in X's home the day before X's death. During the visit, X told
W, in a frightened manner, that D planned to kill X. When W asked
why X thought that, X said, "Because of the way he's been acting."
X then took W to the basement and showed her a new looking
container of rat poison concealed behind a can of turpentine on the
top shelf of a set of ceiling-high shelves. After showing Wthe poison,
X, sobbing, said to W, "We've never had rats in the house." D
responds to the offer of proof by asserting that W's proposed testi-
mony is hearsay and irrelevant. How should the court react?
To the extent that X's declarations to W can be characterized as
manifesting X's fear that D had implicitly threatened to kill X by
his conduct ("the way he's been acting" and his acquisition and
concealment of rat poison absent any legitimate need for it), the
declarations could be said to evidence D's implied threat to kill X.
The declarations are, therefore, being offered to prove the truth of
the matter impliedly asserted therein, i.e., X threatened D's life.
Since X's extrajudicial declarations are being offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted therein, they are hearsay. Should the
state of mind exception serve to avoid the hearsay bar?
The declarations do manifest the state of mind of declarant;
thus, competence is satisfied. Since the state of mind manifested
was that of declarant when the words were spoken, contempora-
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neousness is met. Given the long-standing friendship between X
and W-and the absence of any apparent reason for X to misrepre-
sent her feelings to W-ingenuousness would seem to exist. That
leaves relevancy.
While the state of mind of X (fear that D had threatened to kill
her) at the time of the declarations to W may lack independent
relevancy, the basis for that state of mind (D's implied threat to kill
X) is relevant. Thus, to the extent that the state of mind declara-
tions may evidence the threat, the declarations would also be rele-
vant. The court's task would be to determine whether or not the
declarations do evidence such a threat. In resolving that issue, the
court would be compelled to determine whether or not the fear
manifested by X's declarations was factually well-founded. If there
was a rational basis for the stated fear of X that D had threatened
to kill her, her state of mind declarations manifesting that fear
would be relevant evidence of the threat to kill.
That portion of X's declarations negating the presence of rats in
the house tends to negate a legitimate reason for the acquisition of
the rat poison. It could then be viewed as providing some basis for
a conclusion that, if D acquired the poison, it was for some purpose
other than ridding the house of rats. But there are serious problems
involved in accepting even that limited conclusion. There may have
been rats in the house and their presence could have been known
to D and not realized by X. If that were the case, X's declaration of
the absence of rats would have been factually incorrect. In addition,
notwithstanding its fresh appearance, the container of rat poison
could have been purchased weeks or even months before X discov-
ered it and long before the occurrence of any conduct on the part of
D encompassed by X's declaration, "Because of the way he's been
acting." Moreover, the rat poison could have been acquired and
placed on the top shelf by someone other than D. Given that series
of potentially erroneous conclusions underlying X's declarations to
W, a judicial determination that the declarations were not factually
well-founded would be wholly justified and, perhaps, compelled.
That determination would suggest that X's declarations, because
they were not factually well based, would not constitute relevant
evidence that D had tacitly threatened to kill X.10
20. In such circumstances, the prosecution would be attempting to use X's declarations
as to her belief that D had threatened to kill her as evidence of the fact believed, absent an
appropriate demonstration that the belief was well founded. On that point, I would agree with
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Assume that the prosecution anticipated each of those concerns
on the part of the court and, to assuage them, enlarges its offer of
proof prior to Ws testimony. The prosecution asserts that it will
introduce other witnesses and evidence indicating that there had
been no rats or similar pests in or around the house occupied by X
and D for at least ten years before X's death; that D purchased the
container of rat poison one week before X's death and three days
before X showed it to W; that no one other than X and D had access
to the basement of the house from the time of that purchase until
W saw the container; that four days after W saw the container, the
dead body of X was discovered in the house; and that the cause of
death was ingestion of a portion of the rat poison in the container.
How should the court react to this enlarged offer of proof? The
immediate reaction would be that X knew what she was talking
about when she expressed her fear to W. This immediate reaction
would indicate that X's state of mind declarations were well-
founded, and that D had, by his conduct, threatened X's life. But
wait. Considering the prosecution's enlarged offer of proof, it be-
comes apparent that it will present other, and presumably more
direct, evidence that, absent the presence of rats in or around the
house, D had purchased the rat poison shortly before X's death.
Given that enlarged offer of proof, what probative value remains for
the declarations of X to be testified to by W?
First, the declarations would tend to corroborate the other and
more direct evidence that D had purchased the poison and that
there was no apparent legitimate need for it. Second, the declara-
tions would tend to prove that D's conduct generally and in regard
to X specifically ("Because of the way he's been acting") had led
X to believe, within a few days of her death, that D planned to kill
her. Does either or both of these functions justify the admission of
the offered testimony of W?
The question undoubtedly would be imposed on the court by D's
side-bar assertion that, given the testimony and evidence included
within the prosecution's enlarged offer of proof, W's testimony as to
the conclusion of the California Evidence Code and the Proposed Rules of Evidence that the
state of mind declaration should not be received as evidence of the fact believed. See notes 3
& 13 supra. However, unlike the California Evidence Code and the Proposed Rules of Evi-
dence, I would admit the declaration as evidence of the fact believed in circumstances where
the court is able to make an affirmative determination that the belief was well-founded. See
note 15 supra.
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X's state of mind declarations has diminished probative value; and
that the reduced probative value should be balanced against the
potential prejudice lurking in the continuing, although diminished,
possibility of factual error underlying X's declared state of mind. In
so far as the declarations corroborate, and are, therefore, consistent
with, the more direct evidence that D purchased the poison without
any apparent legitimate need for it, the likelihood of factual error
being the cause of X's state of mind would be diminished. Just as
the state of mind declarations would corroborate the other more
direct and consistent evidence, so, too, would that evidence tend to
demonstrate that the state of mind of X was factually well-founded.
Yet, that diminution of the likelihood that X's state of mind was
not factually well-founded would necessarily have to be weighed
against the diminution of the probative value of those declarations,
once it is recognized that they are merely corroborative. That is not
to suggest that there is anything inherently wrong with corroborat-
ing evidence generally. Rather, it is intended to indicate that where
offered evidence is merely corroborative, and thus not the only
available evidence on the point, any weakness in the offered evi-
dence may tend to become more significant to the trial court re-
quired to rule on its admissibility.2'
21. It seems . . . that in situations, where the danger of the jury's misuse of the
evidence for the incompetent purpose is great, and its value for the legitimate purpose
is slight or the point for which it is competent can readily be proved by other evidence,
the judge's power to exclude the evidence altogether would be recognized.
McCoRMicK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EviDENCE 136 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) (emphasis
added).
In People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944), the court divided on the effect
on the admissibility of a state of mind declaration which would result from corroborating
evidence. The homicide victim on November 22 had stated to her roommate and to her
brother-in-law that she had a dinner date with "Frank" on the night of November 22. The
defendant's name was Florencio Alcalde and he "was called 'Frank' as a nickname." Id. at
188, 148 P.2d at 632. Evidence was received placing the defendant with the victim in the
evening hours before her death and at the murder scene. In addition, the trial court permitted
testimony of the victim's declarations that she had a date with "Frank." Defendant appealed
from his conviction, asserting that receipt of that state of mind declaration constituted
reversible error. The court affirmed the conviction, stating that:
Unquestionably the deceased's statement of her intent and the logical inference to be
drawn therefrom, namely, that she was with the defendant that night, were relevant
to the issue of guilt of the defendant. But the declaration was not the only fact from
which an inference could be drawn that the deceased was with the defendant that
night. Other facts were in evidence from which the inference could reasonably be
drawn. The cumulation of facts corroborative of the guilt of the defendant was suffi-
cient to indicate that the trial court did not err in admitting the declaration.
Id., 148 P.2d at 632.
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In this case, everything contained in X's state of mind declara-
tions and offered to prove that D planned to kill X is merely corro-
borative, except for: (1) X's declaration, "Because of the way he's
been acting," (assuming that to refer to conduct other than that
relating to the rat poison); (2) her frightened declaration that D
planned to kill her (assuming that fear to be the product both of
conduct other than that relating to the rat poison and conduct relat-
ing to the poison); and (3) the clear implication that D, not X, had
placed the poison in the concealed position revealed to W. How
should the court react to that part of the offered declarations which
is merely corroborative? Notwithstanding the corroborating evi-
dence, there remains some possibility that that portion of the decla-
rations may have resulted from either inaccurately discerned facts
or imagined conduct. Given that continuing possibility and the
other more direct evidence of similar facts, the court may be in-
clined to exclude that part of X's state of mind declarations.
That inclination, however, could be tempered, and ultimately
confirmed or rejected, by the court's consideration of the remaining
portions of the declarations. Still reading the declaration, "because
Justice Traynor dissented:
A declaration of intention is admissible to show that the declarant did the intended
act, if there are corroborating circumstances and if the declarant is dead or unavailable
and hence cannot be put on the witness stand. . . .A declaration as to what one
person intended to do, however, cannot safely be accepted as evidence of what another
did . . . .The declaration of the deceased in this case that she was going out with
Frank is also a declaration that he was going out with her, and it could not be admitted
for the limited purpose of showing that she went out with him at the time in question
without necessarily showing that he went with her. . . .There is no dispute as to the
identity of the deceased or as to where she was at the time of her death. Since the
evidence is overwhelming as to who the deceased was and where she was when she met
her death, no legitimate purpose could be served by admitting her declarations of what
she intended to do on the evening of November 22d.
Id. at 189-90, 148 P.2d at 633.
The basic question in Alcalde would seem to be whether or not decedent's state of mind
was factually well-founded. Was she correct in her belief that she had a date with Frank on
the night of November 22? Even leaving aside the corroborating evidence, I am inclined
toward an affirmative answer. It is true, of course, that nearly each of us at some time or
other has confused the time or day of an appointment or date. Still, common sense suggests
that one's belief that she has a date with a romantic attachment on the night of the day the
belief exists is more likely than not to be correct. Justice Traynor's conclusion that there is
no viable distinction between "she went out with him" and "he went with her" is incontrover-
tible factually but puzzling legally. Naturally, declarant's belief that she had a date with
Frank on the night of November 22 could have been mistaken. But, accepting the common
sense suggestion that it was more likely than not correct, then "she went out with him" and
"he went with her"; otherwise, it would not have been a date.
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of the way he's been acting," as a reference to conduct on the part
of D separate and apart from his implied conduct in regard to the
acquisition of the poison, that specific declaration is not merely
corroborative of the other more direct evidence connecting D with
the poison. Rather, it implies that X had discerned other acts on the
part of D which led her to believe that he was planning to kill her.
Appropriate evidence of such a plan would clearly be admissible.
But does the implication of the declaration constitute such appro-
priate evidence? That question would seem to turn on the court's
determination of whether or not the state of mind declaration was
factually well-founded. The court might be willing to indulge in the
assumption that one spouse is uniquely capable of discerning and
interpreting the acts and conduct of the other spouse. Even recog-
nizing that unique capacity, however, the court may have a sub-
stantial lingering concern that X, due to a combination of reasons
beyond satisfactory evidentiary exploration, may have misinter-
preted those other and undescribed acts of D. Here, the problem of
possible misapprehension is considerably more difficult to negate
than the earlier considered issue of whether or not one spouse had
accurately understood the words of the other. While verbalizations
may indeed be subject to different interpretations, the expertness
acquired by one spouse in comprehending the words of the other is
self-apparent. Moreover, in that earlier situation, the repeated as-
sertions of a wife as to her understanding of her husband's words,
apparently absent any contrary indication by her husband, would
substantiate the assumption that the wife had accurately under-
stood the words. But here that which led to X's declaration,
"Because of the way he's been acting," to the extent that it refers
to conduct of D other than that related to the poison, provides the
court with no guidance even for identifying the conduct. Was it a
series of specific acts on the part of D? Was it his general attitude
toward X? Was it a series of conversations between D and X? Or
was it a combination of all of these? Not even the prosecution's
enlarged offer of proof assists the court in determining the basis for
X's declaration. Without evidence of that basis, the court cannot
make an affirmative determination that the state of mind evidenced
by the declaration was factually well-founded. Consequently, as to
that specific portion of X's declarations which was not merely corro-
borative, a rational factual basis seems to be lacking, and the court's
inclination to exclude the totality of the declarations would be con-
firmed.
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There remains, however, one additional aspect of X's declarations
which is not merely corroborative and which does not rest on the
unexplicated state of mind of X. X showed W the container of rat
poison concealed behind a can of turpentine on the uppermost shelf.
The act of X caused W to observe the precise location of the poison.
That observation, in turn, is a rather important part of the prosecu-
tion's case. Clearly, the observation, when testified to by W, has the
capacity of persuading the jury that D had concealed the poison.
The problem for the court would then seem to become a determina-
tion of the extent to which that legitimate capacity would be ad-
versely affected by the exclusion of X's declarations.
Would testimony by W, excluding any reference at all to X, that
W had seen the poison behind a can of turpentine on the top shelf
in the basement, adequately serve the prosecution's legitimate pur-
pose of demonstrating that D had concealed the poison? That ques-
tion must be approached in light of the prosecution's enlarged offer
of proof indicating that it will introduce other evidence that D pur-
chased the poison three days before W saw it; that no one other than
D and X had access to the basement from the time of purchase until
W's observation; that there was no apparent legitimate need for the
poison; and that X's death resulted from ingestion of a portion of
the poison.
Even considering the other evidence encompassed by the prosecu-
tion's enlarged offer, it would appear that W's testimony, stripped
of any reference to X, would hardly serve to demonstrate that D had
concealed the poison. The testimony that W observed the poison,
absent any reference to X, would tend to suggest that the poison
may not have been concealed at all. After all, such testimony would
indicate that the poison had been seen by a visitor to the home.
Moreover, Ws testimony, with no reference to X, would provide no
insight as to whether it had been D or X who placed the poison on
the shelf. Apparently, some references to X in W's testimony would
be necessary for that testimony to demonstrate that the poison was
concealed and that D, not X, concealed it.
Let's attempt to determine the nature and extent of references
to X by W necessary to demonstrate that the poison was concealed,
as opposed to having been merely benignly placed, on the top shelf
behind a can of turpentine. Presumably, W could testify that, had
she been in the basement alone, she would not have seen the poison.
In addition, she might be able to testify that, had she been in the
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basement with X but X had not pointed out the poison, W would
not have seen it. Finally, combining those two factors, W could
testify that she saw the poison only after its location on the top shelf
behind the turpentine had been pointed out to her by X. That
isolated reference to X might be sufficient to demonstrate that the
poison had indeed been concealed.
But by whom? The fact that X pointed out the poison's location
to W would be as consistent with a conclusion that X had concealed
it as it would with the conclusion that D had done so. Even though
D had purchased the poison, it does not necessarily follow that he,
rather than X, placed it in its concealed position. D may have given
the container to X and she may have placed it out of sight. In order
to demonstrate that D, rather than X, had concealed the poison, it
would seem necessary for W to testify to her conversation with X
immediately before X took W to the basement and showed her the
poison. That preceding conversation would include all of X's decla-
rations except for that declaration made after X had shown W the
poison-"We've never had rats in the house." What's the poor trial
judge to do?
There would seem to be three basic alternatives for the court: (1)
admit the declarations of X as a state of mind exception to the
hearsay rule and relevant to the implied threat of D to kill X; (2)
exclude the declarations of X and, necessarily, that portion of W's
testimony indicating that D had concealed the poison; or (3) admit
the declarations of X for the limited purpose of having W's testi-
mony understood as evidence that D had concealed the poison and
instruct the jury to disregard those declarations for any other pur-
pose. None of these alternatives is without substantial difficulty.
To admit the declarations of X as substantive evidence of a plan
on the part of D to kill X would be to overlook the already demon-
strated weakness of the factual basis for X's belief. Even if the
phrase, "Because of the way he's been acting," were excised be-
cause of its uniquely unexplained foundation, X's declaration that
D planned to kill her would remain. To the extent that that state
of mind on the part of X was corroborated by the evidence referred
to in the prosecution's enlarged offer of proof, the state of mind
declaration would become less critical in terms of probative value;
to the extent that the declaration remained uncorroborated, based,
perhaps, on misapprehension, imagination or paranoia, it would
constitute a state of mind declaration not factually well-founded in
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circumstances where an adequate factual basis would be a condition
precedent to an affirmative determination that the declaration was
relevant to demonstrate a plan to kill. The receipt of the declaration
as evidence of the plan to kill would be tantamount to the receipt
in evidence of a wife's fear that her husband wanted her dead,
absent any factual basis for the fear. Such a decision would tend to
realize significantly the undesirable potential of the state of mind
exception to consume the entire hearsay rule.
To exclude X's declarations entirely would be to defeat the prose-
cution's legitimate effort to use W's testimony for the purpose of
demonstrating that the poison had been concealed and that it had
been concealed by D, not X. Given the nature of the case as already
described, it seems fair to conclude that (1) X's declarations to W
would demonstrate that D, not X, had placed the poison where it
was observed by W; (2) the placement of the poison would indicate
a desire to conceal; (3) D's acquisition and concealment of the poi-
son would be relevant evidence of a plan to kill; and (4) that evi-
dence might well be critical to the prosecution's case. Moreover, no
excision of portions of X's declarations uttered prior to W's observa-
tion of the poison would result in a remainder which would satisfac-
torily demonstrate both that the poison had been placed for conceal-
ment and that it had been so placed by D. It is possible, of course,
for the trial judge to "tinker" with W's observations and, by that
device, "mold" her testimony. For example, the court could decide
to have W testify that X, apparently frightened, pointed out the
poison to W. Arguably, that could be understood by the jury as
evidence that D, not X, had concealed the poison. Still, that testi-
mony would not evidence that conclusion nearly as effectively as
Ws testimony as to X's actual declarations. In addition, W's testi-
mony that X was frightened, without explanation or elaboration,
could very well enhance the likelihood of the jury's concluding that
W may have been mistaken in her reading of X's emotional state.
Finally, any effort to mold a witness's testimony in such as way as
to alter, however subtly, the perceptions actually discerned by that
witness, is very likely to affect adversely the demeanor of the wit-
ness, invite cross-examination touching on the artificially fashioned
testimony and, conceivably, result in the need for a full explanation
to the jury. It would appear that X's declarations do not lend them-
selves to such a mode of judicial excision, or, even if they do, such
an effort would probably be awkward at best and self-defeating at
worst.
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That leaves the third alternative: receipt of X's declarations for
the limited purpose of having Ws testimony understood as evidence
that D, rather than X, placed the poison where W saw it and that
W would not have seen it without X's directions. Necessarily, this
approach would require that W testify to all of X's declarations
which preceded W's directed observation of the container of rat
poison, and that the jury be instructed to ignore the totality of those
declarations except for the purpose of determining whether or not
D had concealed the poison.22 The difficulty with this manner of
resolution is that which arises every time a jury is permitted to
consider evidence for one purpose and instructed to ignore it for all
others: How can anyone know that the jury will comply with such
an instruction? It is probably fair to suggest that the jury will if it
can. Failure to comply with such instructions, when such failure
occurs, is more likely to be explicable in terms of psychological
limitations than calculated willfulness. 23 In our situation, the trial
court has a unique opportunity to anticipate and, by proper instruc-
tions, to diminish substantially the feared psychological limitations
of the jury. After all, the court, itself, has already determined that
because X's declarations were not demonstrably well-founded, they
should not be received as evidence of a plan to kill on the part of
D. That which compelled the court to that conclusion was its recog-
nition that X's declarations could have been based on any number
of factors, some real, some imagined, and some misapprehended,
and that there has been no satisfactory demonstration of those fac-
tors. That reasoning was based on reality rather than subtle legal
22. [It] is clear enough that the evidence, competent for the purpose of showing
the state of wife's feelings, is not rendered incompetent by the fact that it also tends
to prove other material matters, to prove which it is not competent. The rule upon this
point, which is one of well-nigh everyday application in actual trial, is thus stated by
Wigmore (volume 1, p.42):
"In other words, when an evidentiary fact is offered for one purpose, and
becomes admissible by satisfying all the rules appliable to it in that capacity,
it is not inadmissible because it does not satisfy the rules applicable to it in some
other capacity, and because the jury might improperly consider it in the latter
capacity. This doctrine, although involving certain risks, is indispensable as a
practical rule."
Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 256, 193 P. 251, 253 (1921).
23. In determining that an accusatory declaration offered by the prosecution as a dying
declaration could not be defended on appeal as a state of mind declaration, Mr. Justice
Cardozo wrote: "It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that our rules of evi-
dence are framed." Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
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nuances. That reality, in turn, lends itself to direct and candid
explanation to the jury. Thus, in this most difficult case of state of
mind declarations, the court should conclude that, while compe-
tence (in the sense of declarant's capacity to know her own mind),
contemporaneousness and ingenuousness exist, the declarations
have only secondary relevancy-the possibility of evidencing a plan
to kill on the part of D-and that possibility can be realized legiti-
mately only to the extent that X's declarations were factually well-
founded. Once persuaded that such a factual foundation 'has not
been adequately demonstrated, the court should exclude the decla-
rations as evidence of a plan to kill, and admit them only for the
limited purpose of indicating that D concealed the poison. The state
of mind declarations would be admissible only to the extent that X's
then existing state of mind that D planned to kill her (even if not
well based factually) served to demonstrate that X had not placed
the poison where W observed it. 4
That conclusion has an additional and intimately related sup-
porting rationale. It can be assumed that evidence indicating that
D, and not X, placed the poison in its position of concealment would
be relevant. After all, acquisition and concealment of the instru-
mentality of death by the accused in a homicide prosecution has
patent relevancy. It has already been determined that X's state of
mind declarations to W, manifesting X's belief that D planned to
kill her and accompanying X's act of pointing out the poison to W,
24. That limited admissibility would be consistent with the California Evidence Code:
[Evidence] of a statement of declarant's then existing state of mind . . . is not
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when:
The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250(a)(2) (West 1966).
It seems preferable, however, not to abandon the explicit application of each of the require-
ments of competence, contemporaneousness, ingenuousness and relevancy in exchange for
that "simpler" mode of admissibility, even assuming that the end result would be the same
admissibility of the declaration. The onus imposed on the court in examining each of those
aspects of the offered declaration would be justified in the consequential nurturing process.
In truth, the California Evidence Code inherently contemplates each of those requisites for
admissibility. By using the phrase "state of mind," the Code assumes declarant's unique
capacity to know his own mind. By modifying the basic phrase with the words "then
existing," the Code requires contemporaneousness. By making § 1250(a)(2), subject to § 1252,
the California Evidence Code would exclude the statement if "made under circumstances
such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness," see note 3 supra, thus assuring ingenuousness.
Since relevancy is a sine qua non to admissibility of any offered evidence, the California
Evidence Code implicitly requires that the evidence offered to prove or explain acts or con-
duct of the declarant be relevant.
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constitute evidence that D, rather than X, concealed the poison.
Assuming the relevancy of the act of concealment by D, those decla-
rations of X become relevant evidence of D's act of concealment.
That relevancy exists without regard to whether or not X's fear that
D planned to kill her was factually well-founded. X's declared fear,
whether or not well-founded, accompanied by her act of showing W
the poison, is certainly relevant evidence that the poison was con-
cealed by D. Consequently, admitting X's declarations for the lim-
ited purpose of permitting the jury to understand Ws testimony as
evidence of concealment by D is justified by the conclusion that
those declarations, without regard to their factual basis, comprise
evidence relevant to the admittedly relevant fact of concealment of
the poison by D. That secondary relevancy of X's declarations
subsists even assuming those declarations lack a factual foundation.
Since competence (in the sense of declarant knowing her own state
of mind), contemporaneousness and ingenuousness coincide with
that secondary relevancy, admission of the declarations for the lim-
ited purpose stated can be seen to be the product of a refined state
of mind test.
It becomes apparent that, as the factual situations change, the
state of mind exception to the hearsay rule can be relatively easy
or extraordinarily difficult for court and counsel. In every factual
setting, however, appropriate utilization or rejection of the excep-
tion can be facilitated by isolating and testing each of the founda-
tions upon which it rests: competence, contemporaneousness, in-
genuousness and relevancy. Both judges and lawyers should remain
sensitive to the distinction between primary and secondary rele-
vancy, and to the delicate, yet critical, determination of whether or
not the declaration, in order to serve its purported evidentiary func-
tion, must be factually well-founded. To the extent that court and
counsel approach every asserted state of mind declaration with
these considerations at hand, this exception to the hearsay rule may
lose some of its perniciousness and most of its elusiveness.
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